Since 2004, the Cassini spacecraft has flown by Titan and other Saturn moons numerous times, successfully accomplishing its 100th targeted encounter of Titan in March 2014. The navigation of Cassini is challenging, even more so with "double flybys," two encounters separated by at most a few days. Because of this tight spacing, there is not enough time for a maneuver in between. Additionally, maneuvers prior to a double flyby only target one of the two encounters. This paper discusses the challenges faced by the Cassini Navigation Team with each double flyby, as well as lessons learned during operational support of each dual encounter. The strengths and weaknesses of the targeting strategies considered for each double flyby are also detailed, by comparing downstream ∆V costs and changes to the non-targeted flyby conditions.
I. Introduction

S
ince beginning a Saturn tour in July 2004, the Cassini spacecraft has been successfully navigated to flybys of Titan and other Saturn moons numerous times, accomplishing its 100th targeted encounter of Titan in March 2014. Targeted encounters are achieved through propulsive maneuvers which are performed to meet flyby aimpoint and timing conditions. To accurately determine the Cassini spacecraft's orbit and to design and perform maneuvers, an adequate amount of time is necessary between each targeted flyby. During the four-year prime tour of Saturn and its moons and the two extensions to the tour, the Equinox and Solstice Missions, the nominal minimum time between encounters was set to 16 days.
1 At various times from 2005 through 2011, there were exceptions to this rule mainly in the form of "double flybys," when Cassini would target two encounters separated by at most a few days. Double flybys are highly valuable for their science return, but operationally challenging as there is insufficient time to design, uplink, and execute a maneuver in between the two encounters. Instead, maneuvers that precede a double flyby can only directly target one of the two encounters. Hence, careful attention is given to the effects that these maneuvers and the targeted encounter have on the non-targeted flyby.
Six of the 7 double flybys that have occurred in the mission involved a Titan encounter and a close flyby of either Dione, Enceladus, or Rhea. A Titan aimpoint miss of a few kilometers could manifest into a large downstream ∆V penalty. Even if Titan is targeted instead of the icy satellite, the uncertainty in the icy satellite's ephemeris could result in a significant miss at Titan. This paper discusses these and other challenges faced by the Cassini Navigation Team with each double flyby in the Saturn tour, as well as lessons learned during operational support of each dual encounter. The strengths and weaknesses of the targeting strategies considered for each double flyby are also detailed, by comparing downstream ∆V costs and changes to the non-targeted flyby conditions such as altitude and timing. A total of seven double flybys were accomplished in the Cassini Mission and are listed in Table 1 . Six of the 7 dual flybys involved a Titan encounter and a close flyby of either Dione, Enceladus, or Rhea. For each encounter, the table includes the time of closest approach (TCA), flyby altitude, and flyby ∆V imparted to spacecraft, as defined by the reference trajectory; whether the flyby is inbound or outbound, the differences between the orbit determination (OD) reconstructed values for TCA and altitude and the reference trajectory values, the 3-dimensional position flyby errors, and the list of planned OTMs for targeting the double flyby (also indicating whether performed via MEA or RCS or cancelled). Two encounters comprise a double flyby if all of the following conditions are met:
III. Overview of Double Flybys
1. Inadequate time to design and implement a maneuver in between the two flybys (∼3 days or less) 2. Both flyby altitudes or ∆Vs imparted by flybys impact maneuver designs:
• For Titan, periapsis altitudes are generally less than 10,000 km
• For the icy satellites, periapsis altitudes are generally under 2,000 km
• Flyby ∆Vs imparted are greater than ∼2 m/s 3. A large error in the first encounter would significantly alter the second flyby's geometry, resulting in at least one of the following:
• Degraded science at the second flyby
• Increased risk of impact at second flyby There were three double flybys during the four-year Prime Mission. The first double flyby comprised of a targeted Titan-3 (T3) and a non-targeted close Enceladus flyby (3En) during the first year of the tour. Following two days after the T3 encounter on February 15, 2005 , the non-targeted Enceladus flyby, also informally known as Enceladus-0 (E0), was the first close flyby of this icy satellite in the mission. The radio-metric data before and after this encounter enabled an accurate determination of Enceladus' mass.
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The feasibility of double flybys from a navigation stand-point was demonstrated with the successful Tethys (15Te)/Hyperion-1 dual encounter, which paved the way for the four Titan/icy satellite double flybys of the Equinox and Solstice Missions.
2 This important double flyby, as well as the four double flybys of the extended missions, will be discussed in the next sections. Finally, the Rhea (49Rh)/Titan-35 (T35) double flyby was achieved in August 2007. The non-targeted close Rhea flyby and the targeted T35 encounter were used to set up the Iapetus-1 (I1) encounter on September 10, 2007, the first and only targeted flyby of Saturn's moon Iapetus. A non-targeted Tethys flyby (15Te) at an altitude of 29,800 km was scheduled on September 24, 2005, two days prior to a 1010 km targeted Hyperion flyby, designated Hyperion-1 (H1), the only Hyperion flyby of the entire mission. While searching for low ∆V cost trajectory options to reduce the September 23, 2005 E-ring crossing impact probability, the most hazardous ring crossing in the Prime Mission, an opportunity to lower the flyby altitude of the Tethys flyby was unveiled. With the 050505 reference trajectory update, the Tethys flyby was lowered to 1500 km, the closest Cassini would fly by Tethys during the entire mission. Due to trajectory deviations caused by the tweak in the Tethys flyby, the targeted H1 flyby was lowered to 510 km to save ∆V. The increase in the predicted B-plane and down-track uncertainties resulting from lowering the 15Te flyby, which also included execution errors following a large main engine burn (OTM-033), did not preclude meeting the pointing requirements at the Hyperion flyby. Thus, the navigational capability to fly a 1500 km, non-targeted 15Te flyby was proven. Through the implementation of various trajectory modifications and constraints, it was shown that a double flyby of Tethys and Hyperion was navigationally feasible in the Prime Mission, 2 leading to the inclusion of double flybys in the extended missions. Following an accurate Titan encounter on September 7, 2005, OTM-032 was cancelled and OTM-033 alone targeted the H1 flyby (see Table 2 ). OTM-033, a large main engine maneuver of ≈28 m/s, was performed six days before the H1 encounter on September 19, 2005 and was used to setup both the H1 and Dione-1 (D1) encounters, while achieving the non-targeted Tethys flyby. 7 To meet the H1 pointing requirements, tracking data up to 17 hours prior to the execution time of OTM-034 was included in the OD delivery. Although OTM-034 was cancelled, this OD solution was used to update the instrument pointing vectors for science observations of Hyperion. Prior to the 15Te/H1 double flyby, optical navigation data of the satellites and several close encounters with Titan and Enceladus had improved the Hyperion and Tethys ephemerides significantly to approximately 5 km and 6 km (1-σ), respectively. The achieved Tethys flyby altitude was 1496.7 km, 12.4 km higher than predicted at the time of the OTM-034 design. This change in altitude is mainly due to the Tethys ephemeris prediction error of 18 km (3-σ), mainly in the down-track direction. This Tethys flyby error caused the 5 km (2-σ) miss from the prediction of the OTM-34 OD solution at the Hyperion flyby. The Hyperion satellite ephemeris change was small (< 2 km) after the encounter. The achieved Hyperion flyby altitude was 487.5 km, 22.5 km lower than the OTM-033 target value of 510.0 km. This flyby also confirmed Hyperion's previously estimated mass. The inbound Enceladus-6 (E6) encounter on October 31, 2008, at an altitude of 200 km, was made three days prior to the outbound Titan-46 (T46) flyby on November 3, 2008 , at an altitude of 1100 km. The E6/T46 double flyby, the first of three double flybys in the Cassini Equinox Mission reported by Cassini Navigation in Reference 11, had the added complexity of being a quasi pi-transfer between the two encounters, with E6 in the proximity of pericrone and T46 near apocrone. Early in the design process the decision was made to target the second of the two encounters, T46, in order to lower the projected ∆V cost. The trajectory leading to the double flyby was marked by the sensitivities of the first two targeting maneuvers, OTMs 167 and 168, and the sub-par performance of OTM-169, the final approach maneuver to E6/T46. The cancellation of OTM-166, the final maneuver to target the prior Enceladus-5 (E5) encounter on October 9, 2008, would have resulted in a downstream ∆V cost of over 1 m/s, above the allowable penalty for canceling a maneuver of 0.5 m/s at this point in the mission. Additionally, canceling OTM-166 produced an E6 impacting trajectory with the nominal designs of OTMs 167 and 168 (see OTM-166 AS in Table 4 ). Hence, OTM-166 was performed to closely adhere to the reference trajectory in an effort to reduce downstream sensitivities in the trajectory.
Three maneuvers were scheduled for the E6/T46 double encounter: OTMs 167, 168, and 169, as listed in Table 3 . Due to the near singularity between OTM-168 and either E6 or T46, resulting in more than one possible maneuver design, special measures were taken in the designs of OTMs 167 and 167 BU. For Cassini, the executions of main engine burns are delayed by approximately 7.5 seconds. Even to this level, the time delay had to be considered with the main engine OTM-168 in the OTM-167 design because OTM-168 was highly sensitive to the execution time by its proximity to pericrone (see OTM-167 NS in Table 4 ). Without this adjustment, the resulting OTM-168 design produced an impactor of E6. Additionally, the OTM-168 burn time had to be adjusted if OTM-167 BU was to be executed because OTM-167 BU / OTM-168 targeting to T46 also resulted in an E6 impactor (see OTM-167 AS-2 in Table 4 ). For the T46 targeting strategy, changing the OTM-168 burn time to 10 minutes earlier not only removed the E6 impactor, but also moved E6 near the reference altitude of 200 km (see OTM-167 AS-3 in Table 4 ). Of special note is OTM-168 BU, which was identified as a costly maneuver and scheduled only 5 hours after the prime maneuver time to minimize ∆V cost (see OTM-168 AS in Table 4 ).
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OTM-169, the approach maneuver targeting T46, was executed as a large RCS burn with a ∆V of 0.23 m/s. This maneuver underperformed significantly, resulting in a nearly 10 km miss of a low 1100 km Titan flyby and a downstream cost of over 7 m/s. This sub-par performance was due to the degradation of the primary RCS A-branch thrusters, leading to a swap to the redundant B-branch thrusters in March 2009. The inbound Titan-67 (T67) encounter on April 5, 2010 , at an altitude of 7462 km, was followed two days later by the 500 km Dione-2 (D2) flyby on April 7, 2010 . This was the first of two nearly back-to-back double flybys near the end of the Equinox Mission, first reported by Cassini Navigation in Reference 14. Three maneuvers were planned for the T67/D2 double flyby: OTMs 239, 240, and 241, as listed in Table 5 . The nominal strategy was to target OTM-239 to the Cartesian position of OTM-240, and OTM-240 to the T67 encounter (see OTM-239 NS in Table 6 ). This would put Cassini on the reference trajectory and better guarantee both T67 and D2. As a result of the E6/T46 double flyby earlier in the Equinox Mission, this 'XYZ' targeting strategy for the cleanup and apoapsis maneuvers was baselined for targeting a double flyby, over the navigation tour strategy of chaining the cleanup maneuver with downstream maneuvers. However, the larger-than-expected miss at the R2 flyby due to a ∼3 km error in the Rhea ephemeris 15 made this 'XYZ' targeting strategy more costly, adding more than 2.2 m/s to the downstream cost. By optimizing OTM-239 with OTM-240 to either T67 or D2, more than 1.5 m/s could be saved. Because less than 1 mm/s was placed into OTM-239 in both cases by the optimizer in the maneuver search software, the OTM-239 / OTM-240 optimization strategies effectively reduce to canceling OTM-239 and performing OTM-240 only (see OTM-239 AS-1 and OTM-239 AS-2 in Table 6 ). The R2 to T67/D2 trajectory deviations for each alternate targeting strategy as compared to the 'XYZ' targeting strategy are shown in Figure 4 .
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The science team preferred the option to target Dione because the observations at Dione were more sensitive to trajectory deviations, and to preserve a Janus observation which would be missed if T67 was targeted.
14 The project decided to cancel OTM-239 and target D2 with OTM-240 only (see OTM-239 AS-2 in Table 6 ). The deviations at T67 by targeting D2 were acceptable as T67 was a high Titan flyby (7462 km altitude), allowing the non-targeted T67 altitude to be 24 km lower than planned. The targeting strategy for the next double flyby (E10/T68) was closely tied to the accuracy of the T67/D2 dual encounter; performing OTM-241 would help guarantee the 'XYZ' targeting strategy for the E10/T68 double flyby would be preserved. Canceling OTM-241, the final approach to the T67/D2 dual flyby, would have incurred a predicted cost of 0.53 m/s. This cost can be visualized via contour plots of downstream ∆V cost vs. B-plane aimpoint miss (see Reference 16 for how the contour plots are produced). In Figure 5a , the blue ellipse is the 1-σ OD error ellipse corresponding to the cancellation of OTM-241 and the black ellipse is the 1-σ delivery ellipse following the execution of OTM-241. This cost comes from the difference between preserving the 'XYZ' targeting of OTM-245 to the state at OTM-246 (if OTM-241 is performed) and optimizing OTM-245 with OTM-246 (if OTM-241 is cancelled). This targeting strategy difference is shown in the trajectory deviations from E9 to the E10/T68 double flyby (see Figure 5b) . Similar to Rhea, there was a large correction to Dione's ephemeris following the T67/D2 double flyby, 15 resulting in a significant miss at Titan which, fortunately, did not translate into a large downstream cost.
C. Enceladus-10/Titan-68 (May 2010)
This was the third and last double flyby in the Equinox Mission, only one month after the T67/D2 dual encounter. Again, Titan was chosen as the targeted flyby. The first maneuver targeting to the double flyby, OTM-245, was scheduled only 36 hours after the prior Enceladus-9 (E9) flyby, instead of the typical 3 days. Because of this shortened timeline, preliminary analysis had to begin earlier before the E9 flyby and the final analysis just after the flyby. The targeting of the double flyby also had to preserve a solar Enceladus plume occultation prior to Enceladus-10. The E10/T68 double flyby was previously reported by Cassini Navigation in Reference 14. Three maneuvers were scheduled for the E10/T68 dual encounter: OTMs 245, 246, and 247, as shown in Table 7 . Like the T67/D2 double flyby, the nominal strategy involved targeting the cleanup maneuver (OTM-245) to the Cartesian position at the time of the apoapsis maneuver (OTM-246), and then targeting OTM-246 to the T68 flyby (see OTM-245 NS in Table 8 ). One alternate strategy was to also target OTM-245 to the OTM-246 state, but use OTM-246 to meet the E10 encounter conditions (see OTM-245 AS-1 in Table 8 ). This strategy yielded an additional cost of 3.1 m/s over the nominal strategy. The alternate strategy of chaining OTMs 245 and 246 and targeting the T68 flyby (see OTM-245 AS-2 in Table 8 ) resulted in a downstream total ∆V similar to the nominal strategy. However, the E10 flyby would have been lowered by 15 km and the TCA off by nearly 2 seconds, producing unacceptable trajectory deviations as illustrated in Figure 6b for many sensitive science observations planned around the E10/T68 dual flyby, including an Enceladus plume occultation prior to E10. 26.254 (−0.136) * +: chain maneuvers, →: target to specified maneuver state, ⇒: target to specified flyby conditions † T68 time changed by +1.42 sec to bring OTM-247 to an implementable ∆V size.
Targeting OTM-246 to E10, at both the prime and backup opportunities, became costlier due to the execution errors following OTM-245 at 4.3 m/s and 10.4 m/s, respectively (see OTM-246 AS-1 and AS-3 in Table 8 ). The nominal strategy of targeting OTM-246 to T68 was chosen to setup the E10/T68 double flyby and to get off an impacting trajectory following the execution of OTM-245 (see OTM-246 NS in Table 8 ). Finally, OTM-247 was not required and was cancelled to save 0.14 m/s (see OTM-247 AS in Table 8 ).
D. Dione-3/Titan-79 (December 2011)
This would be the sole double flyby of the Cassini Solstice Mission and the last planned for the mission, first reported by Cassini Navigation in Reference 17. Titan was chosen as the target over Dione to avoid a possible downstream cost. Like the Enceladus-6/Titan-46 double flyby, the second targeting maneuver to the Dione-3/Titan-79 double flyby became prohibitively large at its backup window. Also, because of the poor performance of the approach maneuver to the Enceladus-6/Titan-46 double flyby, an auxiliary maneuver was added prior to the nominal final approach maneuver to the Dione-3/Titan-79 double flyby to mitigate the chance of a large RCS or small main engine burn for the final correction maneuver. However, a 3-σ change at Dione-3 from ephemeris errors caused a large miss at Titan, 15 which translated into a small downstream cost thanks to the favorable direction of the miss and the re-optimization of the following Titan target.
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Four maneuvers were scheduled for the D3/T79 dual flyby: OTMs 299, 300, 300a, and 301, as listed in Table 9 . OTM-300 was designed to perform the brunt of the work in changing the Titan aimpoint shift and TCA, as well as crossing the Titan impact disc. The 'XYZ' targeting strategy was again set as the nominal strategy for targeting a double flyby, where the cleanup maneuver OTM-299 was targeted to the state at OTM-300, and the apoapsis maneuver OTM-300 was targeted to the T79 encounter (see OTM-299 NS and OTM-300 NS in Table 10 ). Targeting OTM-300 to the D3 flyby would result in a 14 km miss, adding 2.6 m/s Table 10 ). Performing OTM-300 at the backup opportunity to target T68 would incur an additional 0.77 m/s cost from the nominal strategy (see OTM-299 AS-2 in Table 10 ). Targeting OTM-300 to the D3 flyby was predicted to cost 3.2 m/s over the nominal strategy (see OTM-300 AS-1 in Table 10 ). This alternate strategy would also lower the Titan altitude by about 18 km and yield a larger deviation from the reference trajectory leading to the D3/T79 double flyby, as shown in Figure 7b . Because of the large penalty at the OTM-300 backup window, several studies were conducted to search for the least costly backup maneuver designs. 18 The earliest placement of the OTM-300 backup window was identified as 12 hours after the prime location. This backup location was given the special designation OTM-300c. In the case of a safing event, either OTM-300c or OTM-300 BU would be performed, designed in an optimization chain with OTM-300a and allowing the D3 and T79 flybys to float (see OTM-300 AS-2 and OTM-300 AS-3 in Table 10 ).
As a result of the underperformance of the large final approach RCS burn to the E6/T46 double flyby (OTM-169) described in an earlier section, OTM-300a was inserted between OTM-300 and OTM-301 to mitigate the chance of OTM-301 becoming a large RCS burn. In the absence of OTM-300a, OTM-301 would have to make a large T68 B-plane correction of over 200 km, similar to the nearly 300 km that OTM-169 corrected at the T46 B-plane. With OTM-300a, OTM-301 only had to correct approximately 14 km, reducing the risk of a large T68 flyby miss which could translate to a large downstream ∆V penalty.
OTM-301 was performed to avoid a downstream penalty of nearly 3 m/s, as shown by the OD error ellipse (blue) in Figure 8 . The contour plot also reveals how a small Titan B-plane miss can result in a large downstream cost. For example, a small shift in the Dione ephemeris following D3 could result in a 5 km OD error at T79, translating into a 1 m/s downstream penalty.
VI. Lessons Learned
The Cassini tour of Saturn continues to offer the navigation team a broad experience, the mission to date surpassing 100 Titan flybys and achieving dozens of close encounters with Enceladus and other icy satellites. This navigation experience is enhanced with double flybys interspersed throughout the Cassini mission from 2005 to 2011. In particular, the navigation of the four double flybys of the Equinox and Solstice Missions taught several lessons that not only helped navigation operations of subsequent double flybys, but also navigation as a whole.
During the Prime Mission, it was learned to not perform the final approach maneuver to an encounter with main engine. This lesson proved costly with the execution of OTM-145, the approach maneuver to target the Titan-41 (T41) flyby. OTM-145 had a ∆V of 0.30 m/s and was performed as a small main engine burn instead of a large RCS maneuver. 19 Because of the larger execution errors associated with a main engine burn and a low 1000 km Titan flyby, a nearly 5 km miss at T41 manifested into more than a 3 m/s downstream penalty. As a result, only RCS will be used for final approach maneuvers.
With the first dual encounter of the Equinox Mission, E6/T46, several lessons were identified and applied to the subsequent double flybys of the mission. For the E6/T46 double flyby, the nominal maneuver strategy of optimizing the cleanup maneuver with the apoapsis maneuver was utilized to minimize predicted downstream ∆V costs. As another option, the cleanup maneuver can be targeted to the Cartesian position at the time of the apoapsis maneuver, and the apoapsis maneuver targeted to the flyby. Although this alternative strategy is potentially more expensive in ∆V, the trajectory that follows is generally closer to the reference trajectory, increasing the likelihood of achieving the double flyby conditions. This 'XYZ' targeting approach was adopted for the remaining double flybys in the mission. As described previously, OTM-169, the approach maneuver targeting T46, was executed as a large RCS burn with a ∆V of 0.23 m/s and significantly underperformed yielding a nearly 10 km Titan miss and a downstream cost of over 7 m/s. The large Titan miss following the sub-par performance of OTM-169 would have been mitigated if an auxiliary maneuver such as OTM-168a was placed between OTM-168 and OTM-169. With more time-to-go, OTM-168a would have been a smaller maneuver to target the T46 flyby and OTM-169, if needed, would likely have remained small. In the planning of the D3/T79 double flyby in the Solstice Mission, OTM-300a was inserted between OTM-300 and OTM-301 to keep the latter maneuver from becoming a large RCS burn.
When Titan was part of a double flyby, there was no clear benefit in targeting the icy satellite because of the ephemeris uncertainties. For the T67/D2 double flyby, Dione could be targeted over Titan because T67 was a high flyby of 7462 km. So a miss in T67 would not be as costly as a miss of a close Titan flyby. Other than the T3/E0 dual flyby, the second encounter in each double flyby was targeted. Titan was the second flyby in most of these cases, with the exception of the T67/D2 double encounter. The inclusion of optical navigation data was seen to help reduce the OD uncertainties at the double encounters, specifically for the T67/D2 and E10/T68 dual flybys.
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In both extended missions, there were a number of deterministic maneuvers that occurred at locations near Saturn periapsis. The associated backup maneuvers, which are generally scheduled one day after the prime maneuver locations, showed fairly high ∆V costs both in the maneuvers themselves and in downstream maneuvers. 12, 18 These magnified ∆V costs were seen with OTM-168 BU (prior to E6/T46 double flyby) and OTM-300 BU (prior to D3/T79 dual encounter). Even if a backup maneuver is not expensive to perform, the change in the flyby arrival asymptote may cause a large miss of the non-targeted encounter, which in turn can produce a large downstream ∆V penalty.
VII. Conclusion
After nearly 10 years, the Cassini spacecraft has toured Titan and Saturn's icy moons over 100 times. This flyby-extensive tour has been a challenge for the Cassini Navigation Team, even more so with the inclusion of double flybys. The seven dual encounters that occurred from 2005 through 2011 spanned all Cassini tour phases (Prime, Equinox, and Solstice Missions). This paper discussed the navigation strategies for each of these double flybys, as well as the experience gained from each. Lessons learned from the four double flybys of the extended missions, which were actively managed by the Cassini Navigation Team, helped shape the Cassini Project's maneuver decision process and also continue to influence this process in the remainder of the mission.
Appendix B: B-Plane Description
Planet or satellite approach trajectories are typically described in aiming plane coordinates referred to as "B-plane" coordinates 4 (see Figure 10 ). The B-plane is a plane passing through the target body center and perpendicular to the asymptote of the incoming trajectory (assuming two-body conic motion). The "Bvector," B, is a vector in that plane, from the target body center to the piercing-point of the trajectory asymptote. The B-vector specifies where the point of closest approach would be if the target body had no mass and did not deflect the flight path. Coordinates are defined by three orthogonal unit vectors, S, T and R, with the system origin at the center of the target body. The S vector is parallel to the spacecraft V ∞ vector (approximately the velocity vector at the time of entry into the gravitational sphere of influence). T is arbitrary, but it is typically specified to lie in the ecliptic plane (e.g., EMO2000), or in a body equatorial plane (e.g., EME2000). Finally, R completes an orthogonal triad with S and T (i.e., R = S × T).
A target point can be described in terms of the Bvector dotted into the R and T vectors (B · R and B · T). The spacecraft state in the B-plane can be represented by the following six quantities: B · R, B · T, TF (time-of-flight), S · R, S · T, and C 3 . S · R and S · T are the declination and right ascension of the incoming asymptote S and C 3 is the vis-viva integral (V 2 ∞ ). The B-plane error (miss) is determined by ∆B · R, ∆B · T, and ∆TF; the asymptote error is determined by ∆S · R, ∆S · T, and ∆C 3 .
Trajectory errors in the B-plane are often characterized by a 1-σ dispersion ellipse, shown in Figure 10 . SMAA and SMIA denote the semi-major and semi-minor axes of the ellipse; θ is the orientation angle of the ellipse measured clockwise from the T axis. The dispersion normal to the B-plane is typically given as a 1-σ time-of-flight error, where time-of-flight specifies what the time to encounter would be from some given epoch if the magnitude of the B-vector were zero. Alternatively, this dispersion is sometimes given as a 1-σ distance error along the S direction, numerically equal to the time-of-flight error multiplied by the magnitude of the V ∞ vector.
